With the expiry of Sure South Atlantic’s (Sure) exclusive telecommunications licence approaching in December 2027, the Falkland Islands face a pivotal decision on how to structure their future telecoms market. The Sure Exclusive licence ends only after the Falkland Islands Government (FIG) serves notice on them. The exclusive licence then specifies a 6-month transition period, which can be extended to 2 years unilaterally by FIG.
The current monopoly model, established in 1989 with C&W and reaffirmed with Sure in 2017, has faced growing criticism due to limited service flexibility, constrained competition, and a lack of technological innovation. While the recent approval of Starlink signals a shift toward diversification, it does not fundamentally challenge the monopoly structure still embedded in the existing Telecommunications Ordinance. The post argues that maintaining the status quo is no longer justifiable in light of available technologies such as LEO satellites and market precedents. It recommends early, transparent planning to explore viable models that prioritise affordability, innovation, digital inclusion, and long-term resilience, rather than relying on historical defaults that are considered to have little risk, such as exclusivity.
In the two previous posts, Holding Islands Hostage: The Price of Monopolised Broadband? and Holding Islands Hostage: The Price of Monopolised Broadband?, I conjectured that Sure South Atlantic (Sure) may be leveraging various factors in its negotiations with FIG to extend its exclusive licence – particularly in the context of discussions surrounding Starlink’s potential approval in the islands.
With Sure’s exclusive licence set to expire on December 31st, 2027, the central issue in any forward-looking discussion is the role, if any, that exclusivity should play in the model that replaces it. Rather than simply replicating the current monopoly arrangement, several alternative models should be explored. These fall under broad industry terms such as “licensing model,” “market model,” or “regulatory framework.”
Shifting away from an exclusive monopoly may seem daunting for a small and remote community like the Falkland Islands. However, in my experience, such a transition is not only manageable—it can be empowering. Before diving into the challenges this shift might present in a future post, let’s first examine what shape alternative models could take after Sure’s license expires.
A comprehensive and detailed discussion of the pros and cons of each alternative is well beyond the scope of this post, but it should provide a direction for where things could go.
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
There is nothing new in the Falkland Islands about discussing alternative models for telecommunications. Indeed, a comprehensive discussion about market models and the pros and cons of exclusivity was written by economic consultant Chris Doyle for FIG back in 2004.
This topic was extensively discussed in the months leading up to the introduction of the current telecommunications ordinance in 2017, following a submission of a strategic telecommunications report by Cartesian in March 2015. However, a strongly articulated view was held by certain stakeholders that there was little choice but to continue the monopoly regime initially provided to C&W in 1989, managed under an exclusive licence provided to Sure. This was the final preferred option, as it was the most risk-free and safest, as recommended in the Cartesian consultancy report, despite objections from many individuals, including persistent lobbying by the Chamber of Commerce and others, which ultimately had no effect. Agreeing on an exclusive licence being the outcome.
However, in 2025/6 the telecommunications markets and available communication technologies are dramatically different from those in 2015/16/17 and it is undoubtedly the case that a fait accompli in the form of exclusivity will not be the outcome this time around.
Let’s examine some of the alternative models FIG could adopt following the expiration of the Sure exclusive licence.
Extending the exclusive licence
I’ve written extensively in previous posts about the challenges of an exclusive telecommunications regime, so I don’t need to reiterate them here. Indeed, every Falkland Islander knows the reality, as they are living with the consequences daily.
The recent approval of Starlink marks a meaningful step toward broadband competition, but it doesn’t change the fundamental structure of Sure’s exclusive telecommunications licence, which remains in effect until December 31, 2027. Why not? Because under the current Telecommunications Ordinance, FIG-issued VSAT licences have always been technically exempt from Sure’s exclusivity.
In practice, however, things were very different with a successful tactic to protect the monopoly. The licensing process for a VSAT was made prohibitively difficult: applicants had to prove that Sure’s services couldn’t meet their needs and supply extensive technical data that a non-technical consumer or business couldn’t reasonably provide. And, even if they succeeded, they faced an annual fee of £5,400 – an additional obvious deterrent. The result was a system that effectively preserved Sure’s monopoly on broadband and killed any self-provisioning of VSATs in the islands stone dead.
Sure now argues that Starlink’s arrival significantly threatens its revenues and could force its departure from the islands. That argument has been covered in depth in an earlier OpenFalklands post Sure Warns of Profit Loss as Starlink Lands in the Falklands, so I won’t repeat it here.
After a decade under an exclusive licensing regime, I find it hard to believe that many islanders would support its continuation.
When the current Telecommunications Ordinance was drafted a decade ago, LEO satellites like Starlink were still speculative technology. An exclusive licensing model may have seemed like the only viable option at the time. That’s no longer the case.
Full nationalisation
Nationalising the telecommunications infrastructure in the Falkland Islands when Sure’s exclusive licence ends would be a significant decision. One clear benefit is that it would give the FIG complete control over how telecom services are run. This means decisions can be made based on what is best for the public, not just profit. It could also lead to lower prices for customers and allow the FIG to reinvest any extra income into other essential services, such as health or education.
National ownership would also enable the FIG to focus on improving services in Camp and ensure that telecoms support broader goals, such as education, emergency services, or digital access for all. Another advantage is that keeping the infrastructure local would give the islands more control over their digital systems.
Acquiring Sure’s existing infrastructure may seem prohibitively expensive; however, much, if not most, of its telecommunications equipment and software is outdated, with support and warranties lapsing at the end of their life and would likely have been decommissioned or written off in most other countries.
FIG-run services can sometimes be slower or less efficient than those of private companies, and FIG may not possess the necessary technical skills to manage such a complex system today. In practice, the nationalised service would be run on a standalone basis with its own management. It has been commented that the staff currently managing the island’s telecommunications infrastructure and services are very competent. If nationalised, all the staff would transfer to the ‘Newco’.
However, there are also some significant challenges. Without competition or a profit motive, there might also be less incentive to improve or modernise the service – in other words, it could turn into a monopoly all over again.
There’s also the risk that the handover from Sure to a nationalised Newco could be difficult and cause service problems. With limited public funds, spending a significant amount on telecoms could mean less money for other vital areas, which, of course, is a key issue at the moment.
Public-private Partnership
Instead of full nationalisation, the FIG should consider other options. The key one would be a public-private partnership, where the FIG owns the infrastructure but a private licensed company provides services.
The well-known and well-trodden path would be a NetCo/ServCo model. This is where the FIG owns the telecom broadband and 4G infrastructure (NetCo), which provides wholesale services to a private, licensed company -or companies – that manage the services (ServCo). This setup offers a middle-ground option between complete nationalisation and full privatisation. One of the main benefits is that the FIG maintains control of essential island infrastructure, ensuring it supports long-term goals such as rural access, digital inclusion and Universal Service Obligations (See Part IV, the next post). At the same time, a private licensed company brings expertise and efficiency to handle customer services, which can lead to improved service quality and increased innovation, assuming this is achieved by using a non-exclusive license to prevent a repeat of history.
This model can also reduce costs and risks for the FIG, as it doesn’t require building up the technical capacity within FIG to run the entire system.
However, the model isn’t without challenges. It can be complicated to manage, as the division of responsibilities between the FIG and the private company needs to be clear. If coordination is poor, it could lead to service problems. However, with strong regulatory controls, this would be avoided.
In summary, the NetCo/ServCo model strikes a good balance, maintaining public ownership of key infrastructure while leveraging private commercial and technical expertise to deliver services. However, for it to work effectively, it requires good planning, clear rules, and robust regulatory oversight—and, of course, a willingness to take some risk by adopting a new approach.
Some other models
Another alternative Open Access network model, where a single, shared telecommunications network is made available to multiple service providers. This network could be publicly owned or managed by a neutral third party. The primary advantage of this approach is that it fosters competition, which can lead to lower prices, increased choices, and improved service quality for customers. Since providers don’t need to build their own infrastructure, it also reduces duplication and overall costs. However, this model is probably too complex to manage in the Falkland Islands. It may also require public investment or subsidies to be financially viable in such a small and remote setting.
Another option is a cooperative-owned network, where the telecommunications infrastructure is owned and managed by a cooperative comprising local residents, businesses, or public entities. This model maintains ownership and decision-making within the community, ensuring that services are shaped by local needs rather than driven by profit. It can also build strong local trust and support. However, funding the initial setup and maintaining the network can be a big challenge. However, with the small number of businesses in the islands, it is hard to see how this could come about.
Both models offer more community-focused and competitive alternatives to either full privatisation or nationalisation. However, their success in the Falklands would depend heavily on strong coordination, some level of public support or investment, and careful design to suit the islands’ small population and unique geography.
I would hazard a view that these two models are rather too esoteric for the Falkland Islands, although there are well-known examples around the world.
Conclusions
With Sure’s exclusive licence set to expire at the end of 2027, the Falkland Islands are at a critical juncture – one that offers a rare opportunity to reshape the future of telecommunications for the benefit of all islanders. While the current monopoly model may have once been justified by limited technology and capacity in 2017, the landscape has undergone significant changes since then. New LEO technologies, such as Starlink and the soon-to-come direct satellite telephony, evolving global best practices, and the community’s growing demand for better and fairer access, all point to the need for serious consideration of alternative models. Moreover, with Starlink becoming a licensed operator, it will act as a market-based price control mechanism. Such factors were not around in 2017.
The goal must be to create a system that prioritises accessibility, affordability, resilience, and innovation. This means moving beyond outdated assumptions and recognising that monopolies are not the only viable path, even in small and remote communities such as the Falklands.
The time to start planning for this transition is now. Waiting until the final months of Sure’s licence risks repeating the mistakes of the past. By engaging the public, building regulatory capacity, and exploring all options with a clear-eyed view of their trade-offs, the Falklands can craft a telecoms model that truly serves the long-term interests of its people. Every month that Sure delays decisions means another month of high profits for the company.
I heartedly believe that FIG and the Legislative Assembly understand this, and work is underway to explore the possible options available to them when the exclusive license ends. A key element in achieving this is a FIG contract with Cambridge Management Consultants, which was announced in 2024.
Chris Gare, OpenFalklands, July 2025, copyright OpenFalklands
